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13.1  INTRODUCTION
A central project of cognitive science is to explain, at a variety of different levels, 
certain types of mental representations and the cognitive processes responsible for 
them. What is the evolutionary purpose (if any) of the representations? What sorts 
of information are the processes operating on to yield the representations? How are 
the processes and representations implemented in the brain?1
In some cases, answers to these questions presuppose that the representations 
are more or less accurate. The explanation of mental states that represent regions of 
space as empty or matter- filled is bound to cite the fact that successfully navigating 
the world involves accurately tracking which regions are and aren’t empty, and 
explanations for why in a particular instance a region is represented as empty will 
typically cite the fact that it is empty. Likewise for representations of the relative 
distances of filled regions, and (one might naturally think) for visual representations 
of three- dimensional midsized objects.
In other cases, it seems quite possible to answer the above questions without 
presupposing the accuracy of the representations. Cognitive scientists have devel-
oped various accounts of the production and adaptive value of theistic belief that in 
no way presuppose the existence of deities. Color perception can likely be explained 
in terms of the adaptive value of easily detecting ripe fruit or young foliage, by means 
of detecting wavelengths in the visible spectrum, and without presupposing that 
the phenomenal colors represented are actually out there on the surfaces of objects. 
The processes underwriting our moral beliefs and intuitions can presumably be 
explained in terms of the adaptive value of detecting certain benefits and dangers to 
1   These correspond roughly to Marr’s 1 982 three levels of analysis. Needless to say, not all traits will 
have an evolutionary purpose or adaptive value. Some, for instance, are byproducts (“spandrels”) of 
adaptations; see Gould and Lewontin 1 979 for discussion.
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8 ourselves and our kin, and without any reference to a realm of moral facts that the 
processes are supposed to be tracking.2
Suppose that a range of representations can be explained without reference to 
the putative objects, features, or facts represented. Does the availability of such 
explanations debunk those representations, undermining their justificatory status? 
This is an epistemological question, one whose answer can be informed by, but not 
directly read off of, findings in cognitive science. There has been some discussion 
in metaphysics of such explanations, and there have been attempts to wield them 
with debunking intent. But such discussions tend to be carried out in isolation from 
the extensive and nuanced literature on explanatory challenges and debunking 
arguments in metaethics. My aim here is to forge some connections, drawing lessons 
from the moral- debunking literature for the metaphysical- debunking literature and 
vice versa.
As a case study, I’ll focus on material- object metaphysics and our beliefs about 
which midsized objects there are, though lessons learned generalize to explanatory 
challenges that arise in connection with such other metaphysical domains as color, 
causation, time, modality, and persistence.3 In sections 1 3.3– 1 3.4, I examine and 
combat the idea that, because our beliefs about midsized objects can be given an 
“evolutionary vindication,” evolutionary debunking arguments won’t arise for these 
beliefs. In section 1 3.5, I defend an alternative strategy for vindicating them, which 
involves bootstrapping from the very beliefs targeted by the debunking arguments. 
In section 1 3.6, I explain why debunking arguments framed in terms of the insen-
sitivity of targeted beliefs are ineffective against bootstrappers. Finally, in sections 
1 3.7– 1 3.8, I develop and defend an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping, and 
I identify some existing responses to the debunking arguments that run afoul of the 
constraint.
13.2   THE DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS
You turn the corner and see some kids setting fire to a cat.4 You immediately form the 
belief that they’re doing something wrong. You feel inclined to believe this because 
it looks to you or seems to you intuitively that they are doing something wrong. 
I’ll use the term “moral reactions” to cover this whole range of mental states:  the 
experiences, intuitions, felt inclinations, and beliefs.
2   See Leech and Visala 201 1  on religious belief. See Sumner and Mollon 2000 on the evolution of 
color vision, and see Schaffer 201 6, sec. 2, on the prospects of using the cognitive science of color 
vision to debunk color beliefs. Much more on moral belief later in the chapter.
3   See, e.g., Goldman 1 992, chaps. 2– 3; Stroud 2000; Rea 2002; Chalmers 2006, sec. 6; Paul 201 0, 
201 6; Pautz 201 1 , sec. 3; Leslie 201 3; Gow 201 4, sec. 6; Baron et al. 201 5; Benovsky 201 5; Crisp 201 6; 
Schaffer 201 6; and Baron 201 7.
4   The example is from Harman 1 977, 4.
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Moral- debunking arguments attempt to discredit moral reactions by exposing an 
explanatory disconnect between the reactions and the associated facts. Here, in its 
simplest form, is a moral- debunking argument:
(M1)  Your moral reactions are not explained by the moral facts nor are the moral facts 
determined by your moral reactions.
(M2) If so, then you are not justified in retaining your moral beliefs.
(M3) So, you are not justified in retaining your moral beliefs.
Some may want to see the argument restricted in one way or another, so that it 
targets only realists, or only cognitivists, or only nonnaturalists, or only naturalists.5 
But there is no danger in sticking with this simple version of the argument, so long 
as we bear in mind that some philosophers— perhaps because they are antirealists, 
or noncognitivists, or naturalists, or nonnaturalists— may be in a position to wield 
the argument against their intended targets without opening themselves up to a tu 
quoque. The simple argument also nicely structures the moral- debunking debate, 
separating nonskeptics into two categories: those who deny M1 , affirming the in-
dicated sort of explanatory connection between the facts and the beliefs, and those 
who deny M2, rejecting the need for any such connection.
There are different routes to M1 , and one common strategy involves pointing to 
an evolutionary explanation of our moral reactions.6 Those actions that we represent 
as right or obligatory are ones that tend to keep us and ours alive; representing them 
as right or obligatory better motivates us to perform them; and these moral reactions 
now prevail precisely because they enhanced our ancestors’ reproductive success. 
Mutatis mutandis for actions represented as wrong or forbidden.
The idea behind M2 is that if moral facts aren’t explaining our moral reactions 
(or vice versa), then it would take a massive coincidence to end up with beliefs that 
line up with the facts. Since we have no grounds for believing that such a coinci-
dence occurred, we shouldn’t believe that it did, in which case we should not go on 
thinking that our beliefs line up with the facts.
There is also going to be an evolutionary explanation of the perceptual and cog-
nitive mechanisms that convert the “blooming buzzing confusion” in the retinal 
image into representations of three- dimensional midsized objects. Accordingly, we 
ought to consider the prospects of a parallel debunking argument against our “object 
5   See Street 2006; Kitcher 2005, 1 75– 1 76; Joyce 2006, chap. 6; and Bogardus 201 6 respectively. See 
Bedke 2009, 200– 201  and Locke 201 4, 224 n. 8 on restricting the argument to those who have ac-
tually encountered the relevant explanatory challenges; cf. White 201 0, 575, on undermining and 
blocking debunkers.
6   Evolutionary moral- debunking arguments have been advanced in one form or another by Ruse 
1 986, chap. 3; Lillehammer 2003; Kitcher 2005, sec. 4; Joyce 2006; Street 2006; Wilkins and Griffiths 
201 2, sec. 2; Fraser 201 4; and Braddock 201 6, 201 7.
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0 reactions”:  beliefs and associated experiences and intuitions concerning which 
midsized objects there are.
(O1)  Your object reactions are not explained by the object facts, nor are the object facts 
determined by your object reactions.
(O2) If so, then you are not justified in retaining your object beliefs.
(O3) So, you are not justified in retaining your object beliefs.
What was said above in defense of M1  seems to apply equally to O1 : our object 
reactions, like our moral reactions, can be explained by the adaptive value of an 
ability to represent certain kinds of midsized objects. And like M2, O2 can be 
motivated by the observation that once you acknowledge the explanatory discon-
nect, you’d have to admit that it would be a massive coincidence if our beliefs lined 
up with the facts.
In metaethics, there is near consensus that the O- argument is a complete non-
starter. In metaphysics, by contrast, arguments along these lines are deployed con-
stantly against common- sense judgments about how the world divides up into 
midsized objects.7 I will argue that, while parties to the object debates have been 
somewhat overzealous about the prospects of such arguments, they are right to take 
them seriously. But first let us see why the O- argument is summarily dismissed in 
the literature on moral debunking.
13.3  THE EVOLUTIONARY VINDICATION
As indicated at the outset, the evolutionary explanation of a range of 
representations sometimes will and sometimes won’t presuppose the accuracy of 
those representations. Accordingly, in order to get from an evolutionary explana-
tion to the crucial first premise of the debunking argument— that there is no ex-
planatory connection between the reactions and the associated facts— one needs a 
premise to the effect that the facts do not enter into the evolutionary explanation. 
To wit:
(M*) The adaptive value of your moral reactions is not explained by the moral facts.
(O*) The adaptive value of your object reactions is not explained by the object facts.
7   As with the moral arguments, such arguments are sometimes advanced, not with the aim of 
establishing O3, but rather in support some departure from common sense (e.g., antirealism or 
mereological universalism) that would enable one to resist the skeptical conclusion. For arguments 
in the vicinity, see Heller 1 990, 41 – 42; Goldman 1 992, 45– 46; Merricks 2001 , 72– 76; Hudson 2001 , 
sec. 3.8; Sider 2001 , 1 56– 57; Rea 2002; Hawthorne 2006, vi and 1 09; Benovsky 201 5, sec. 2; Sattig 
201 5, 25– 26; Osborne 201 6; Schaffer 201 6, sec. 3.2; and Rose and Schaffer 201 7. For some discussion 
of object- debunking arguments within cognitive science, see Hoffman et al. 201 5 and Hummel 201 5.
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And herein, metaethicists are wont to claim, lies the difference between the two 
arguments: M* is plausible and O* is implausible.8
Why is M* supposed to be plausible? Following Street (2006, sec. 6), let’s compare 
two accounts of the adaptive value of our moral reactions: the adaptive link account 
(ALA) and the tracking account (TA):
(ALA)  Representing actions a1 . . . an as morally right (or wrong) enhances reproductive 
success because representing a1 . . . an as such motivates us to perform (avoid) 
them and performing them enhances (inhibits) reproductive success.
(TA)  Representing actions a1 . . . an as morally right (or wrong) enhances reproductive 
success because a1 . . . an really are morally right (wrong).
ALA seems preferable to TA for a number of reasons. First, it is more parsimonious 
than TA, insofar as the latter invokes a domain of moral truths. Second, ALA is 
illuminating: it makes good sense of why beings with lives like ours— bearing rela-
tively few offspring and needing to cooperate with neighbors— would have the par-
ticular kinds of moral reactions that we do. Third, TA is obscure: it is entirely unclear 
how, for instance, the putative fact that protecting our children really is obligatory 
is supposed to explain, even in part, why believing it’s obligatory helps keep us and 
ours alive. For these reasons, Street suggests, we should reject TA and accept M*.
Why is O* supposed to be implausible? Because it is hard to see how the adaptive 
value of our object reactions could be explained without supposing them to be ac-
curate. It’s adaptive to represent the world in terms of tigers and cliffs, the idea goes, 
only because there are tigers and cliffs. As Street (2006, 1 60– 61 ) puts the point:
In order to explain why it proved advantageous to form judgements about the presence 
of fires, predators, and cliffs, one will need to posit in one’s best explanation that there 
were indeed fires, predators, and cliffs, which it proved quite useful to be aware of, given 
that one could be burned by them, eaten by them, or could plummet over them.
It is not as if there is some more parsimonious, tiger- free explanation of the adaptive 
value of tiger experiences! Thus, the idea goes, we should reject O*. And since the 
object facts do ultimately get in on the explanatory action, insofar as they explain 
why our object reactions are adaptive, O1  of the object- debunking argument is false. 
The full evolutionary story vindicates our object reactions.
8   See Gibbard 2003, 253– 58; Lillehammer 2003, 570– 71 ; Joyce 2006, 1 82; Street 2006, 1 30 and 1 60– 
61 ; 2008, 21 7; Bedke 2009, 202; Enoch 201 0, 436; Schafer 201 0, 472; White 201 0, 587; Wielenberg 
201 0, 441  n. 4; Dreier 201 2, 277; Wilkins and Griffiths 201 2, 1 34– 39; Fitzpatrick 201 5, 885; and 
Vavova 201 5, 1 08; for a notable exception, see Clarke- Doane 201 5, sec. 4. Alternatively, one might 
point to differences in proximate explanations: midsized objects can cause object reactions, whereas 
moral objects (properties, facts) are causally inert. See my 201 4, sec. 5; 201 5, chap. 7.4, on the inad-
equacy of this sort of response.
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2 Or so it would seem. As we are about to see, there is more to O*— and less to 
the putative difference between the two debunking arguments— than meets the eye.
13.4  NO EVOLUTIONARY VINDICATION
The envisaged evolutionary vindication of object reactions turns on the idea that 
we need to assume the accuracy of our object reactions in order to explain their 
adaptive value. But that’s just a mistake. In order to explain the adaptive value of our 
object reactions, it’s enough to suppose that we are reliably tracking what nourishes 
us, endangers us, or can otherwise feature in adaptive or maladaptive interactions. 
But reliably tracking such things is entirely compatible with certain ways of 
misrepresenting which midsized objects there are. In particular, misrepresenting the 
world of midsized objects will still be adaptive so long as we reliably misrepresent it.9
To see what I have in mind, let’s return briefly to what was supposed to be a par-
adigm case of representations whose adaptive value presupposes their accuracy: our 
representations of regions as empty or matter- filled. Not so fast. Even the regions we 
visually represent as empty are typically filled by gaseous matter. So we misrepresent 
those regions. Nevertheless, the misrepresentations reliably track the difference that 
matters to successful navigation, namely, which are and aren’t filled by nongaseous 
matter. They reliably misrepresent such regions as empty, and they are adaptive de-
spite the harmless misrepresentation.1 0
The case for moral debunking is also usefully framed in terms of reliable misrepre-
sentation. The error theorist will say that our moral reactions— which divide actions 
into the right and the wrong and the obligatory and the forbidden— misrepresent 
those actions but are nevertheless tracking something important. Those represented 
as right or obligatory tend to promote reproductive success. Those represented as 
wrong or forbidden tend to inhibit reproductive success. The moral reactions can 
be adaptive, despite misrepresenting, precisely because of what they reliably track. 
Indeed, the error theorist might add, misrepresenting actions by imbuing them with 
moral features is superior (evolutionarily) to accurately representing them merely 
as beneficial or detrimental to reproductive success, since the morally charged 
representations better motivate us to choose the beneficial actions.1 1
Now back to objects. Let’s suppose (for the moment) that our own object reactions 
are generally accurate, and let’s contemplate two different ways in which a creature 
might have erroneous object reactions. First, it might misrepresent the regions of 
space filled by midsized objects as containing no solid matter at all. Second, it might 
9   I borrow this useful notion from Mendelovici 201 3, 201 6.
10   Perhaps you’ll think that the sort of “emptiness” we represent the regions as having is compatible 
with their being gas- filled— just as a refrigerator can be empty, in a sense, despite containing shelves 
and drawers. Fair enough. My point can instead be made with hypothetical beings whose emptiness 
representations are more demanding.
11   Cf. Joyce 2005 on the utility of moral fictions.
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misrepresent how a situation divides up into objects, but without misrepresenting 
how solid matter is distributed. For instance, there could be creatures— let’s call 
them “troglodytes”— who, upon encountering a situation containing an ordinary 
dog and tree, believe that there is a dog and a trunk and some branches, but do not 
believe that there is any further object composed of the trunk and the branches. Let’s 
imagine that they don’t even experience the region the tree occupies as being filled 
by a single object, despite experiencing the region as being filled with solid matter. 
Odder still, they represent the scattered region jointly occupied by the dog and the 
trunk as containing a single object. It seems to them that they see a trog: a partly 
wooden and partly furry object composed of the dog and trunk. This would be a 
misrepresentation; there are no trogs.1 2
Importantly, we don’t have to imagine the troglodytes to be under any 
misconceptions about how stuff moves around. They know that the branches are 
firmly attached to the trunk and don’t move (much) independently from one an-
other, and that the dog and trunk aren’t attached and won’t move together. When 
there’s a particularly vicious dog, they run only from the dog, not from the tree. Or, 
as they might put it, it’s only the furry part of the trog— not its wooden part— that 
you have to worry about. Just like us, these troglodytes are tracking the presence, 
changes, and movements of matter that are relevant to their survival and reproduc-
tive success. They reliably misrepresent the world of midsized objects.
Imagining such ways of misrepresenting the object facts points to easily 
overlooked ways in which our own object reactions may be inaccurate. Perhaps 
we’re wrong and the troglodytes are right: there are trogs but no trees. Or perhaps 
we’re both wrong: there are only the atoms arranged dogwise and atoms arranged 
treewise, but no midsized objects composed of the atoms.1 3
With all this in mind, let us return to the question of whether it is possible to ex-
plain the adaptive value of our object reactions without supposing those reactions 
to be accurate. Of course it is. When we seem to see a tree falling towards us, we 
step out of the way and successfully avoid a dangerous situation. To explain why 
seeming to see a tree is adaptive in such dangerous situations, there is no need to 
suppose that they contain falling trees, as opposed to just some branches and the 
wooden part of a trog, or just some atoms arranged treewise. What’s important 
for survival and reproductive success is that we respond appropriately to different 
distributions of matter— pursuing those that tend to nourish us, avoiding those that 
tend to harm us, and anticipating the behaviors of each. What this requires is that 
we have representations that reliably track the dangerous and nourishing stuff, and 
12   Or so I shall assume throughout. See my 201 5 for a defense of a trogless ontology, and see in par-
ticular  chapter 7.3 for an argument that postulating trogs and other such extraordinary objects won’t 
help with the debunking arguments.
13   I am taking for granted that the atoms arranged treewise are not themselves (identical to) a tree. 
See Merricks 2001 , chap. 1  and my 201 5, sec. 3.2.2, on the complaint that the very idea that there are 
atoms arranged dogwise but no dogs is somehow incoherent.
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4 it is neither here nor there whether they accurately represent how the dangerous 
stuff being tracked divides up into objects. Reliable misrepresentation is up to the 
explanatory task.
Not only is the assumption of accuracy not needed to explain the adaptive value 
of our object reactions, it’s hard to see what an assumption of accuracy could add to 
an explanation of the adaptive value of our object reactions. To see this, compare the 
following analogues of Street’s adaptive link account and tracking account:
(ALAO)  Perceptually and conceptually dividing perceived distributions of matter into 
midsized objects of kinds k1 . . . kn enhances reproductive success because doing 
so better enables us to track and anticipate the movements of matter that are 
relevant to our reproductive success.
(TAO)  Perceptually and conceptually dividing perceived distributions of matter into 
midsized objects of kinds k1 . . . kn enhances reproductive success because the 
matter really does divide into objects of kinds k1 . . . kn, whose movements we are 
thereby able to track and anticipate.
It would seem that all of the reasons from section 1 3.3 for preferring ALA to TA 
are equally reasons for preferring ALAO to TAO. First, TAO looks to be less parsimo-
nious: it is committed to the existence of midsized objects, whereas ALAO incurs no 
such commitment.1 4 Second, ALAO makes good sense of why beings with lives and 
environments like ours— which give us no reason to track dogs and trunks as one— 
would wind up with the particular sortal concepts we do, tree and not trog.1 5 Third, 
TAO is obscure: it is entirely unclear how the putative fact that matter really does di-
vide up into trees and the like is supposed to help explain why tracking matter under 
the kind tree is selectively advantageous.
One way to see this last point is to imagine discovering that some of our ancestors 
were troglodytes, but proved to be less fit than those of our ancestors who divided up 
the world into trees and other such familiar kinds.1 6 What could explain why they 
were less fit? One promising explanation is that successfully tracking matter under 
sortals like trog rather than tree required more cognitive resources or slowed pro-
cessing. But in that case, it’s not the inaccuracy of the object reactions that explains 
why they were less fit but rather their cognitive limitations. It’s hard even to make 
sense of the idea that dividing the successfully tracked matter into trogs is less 
14   While there is room for doubt about whether postulating composites in addition to simples 
renders a theory less parsimonious (cf. Schaffer 201 5), requiring the composites to do critical ex-
planatory work does seem to reduce the simplicity of the theory. In any event, ALAO is no less parsi-
monious than TAO. Thanks to Elanor Taylor for helpful discussion.
15   Though see Hirsch 1 993, chap. 5, on some difficulties for explaining why strange ways of dividing 
the world would in principle be maladaptive.
16   Another way to see it is to imagine that we have it wrong and that in fact there are trogs but no 
trees. In that case, would troglodytes thereby enjoy a selective advantage? It’s hard to see why.
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adaptive or less efficient than dividing successfully tracked matter into trees because 
there really are trees but no trogs.
For these reasons, the evolutionary vindication of object reactions is uncon-
vincing. One does not need to assume that object reactions are accurate in order 
to explain their adaptive value. The adaptive value of our object reactions can be 
explained— and, it would seem, explained just as well (if not better)— on the as-
sumption that they reliably misrepresent how distributions of matter divide up into 
midsized objects.
13.5  BOOTSTRAPPING TO VINDICATION
Our object reactions cannot be vindicated on the grounds that their evolutionary 
explanations make indispensable reference to their accuracy. They don’t. There is, 
however, a more promising way of vindicating our object reactions.
Even when some phenomenon can be explained without reference to a certain 
range of entities or facts, we may still sometimes have good reason to prefer a less 
parsimonious explanation that does make reference to them. Suppose, for instance, 
that I observe the creation of a xion in a particle accelerator. This is typically the 
result of a single yion colliding with a single zion, though it could in principle re-
sult from two yions colliding with a zion and overdetermining the creation of the 
xion. Which explanation should I prefer? If all I observe is the effect, the newly 
created xion, it would be unreasonable to prefer the latter explanation. But if I actu-
ally observed the two yions simultaneously colliding with the zion, then given my 
total evidence I should prefer the second explanation. This is so even though the 
second is a less parsimonious explanation of the appearance of the xion considered 
in isolation.
Similarly, my object reactions can either be explained simply by reference to 
the atoms arranged midsized- objectwise or, less parsimoniously, by both the atoms 
and the midsized objects they compose. Which explanation should I prefer? If my 
observations include only the effects, the object- representing mental states, then it 
would be unreasonable to adopt the latter explanation. But this isn’t all that I have 
observed. I have observed the midsized objects themselves. I have seen dogs and 
trees and even a few tigers, and I can see that they have volumes and masses and 
everything else it takes to be causally interacting with things. So, given my total 
evidence— which includes the noninferential, direct perceptual evidence that there 
are dogs and trees— I should prefer the second explanation, on which my object 
reactions are caused by midsized objects. This is so even though this is a less par-
simonious explanation of my object reactions (the mental states) considered in 
isolation.
There is, to be sure, a glaring disanalogy between the two cases. In the xion case, 
I presumably have independent evidence of the reliability of whatever equipment 
is informing me about the number and behavior of the yions. But when it comes 
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6 to my object reactions, I have no independent evidence of their reliability, no in-
dependent means of confirming that there really are trees out there— not just trogs 
and branches, or just atoms arranged treewise— answering to my tree experiences. 
And yet, despite lacking any independent evidence for the reliability of my object 
reactions, here I am reasoning from those reactions to the conclusion that midsized 
objects are causing my experiences.
To put a label on it, let’s say that one bootstraps from the deliverances of some 
source of information when one reasons from the deliverances of that source to a 
vindication of that source, while having no independent evidence of its reliability 
or of the accuracy of those particular deliverances. What makes the object- reaction 
reasoning different from xion- creation reasoning is the bootstrapping.
There is something unsettling about bootstrapping. It reeks of “question- begging.” 
And yet bootstrapping is rampant in the moral- debunking literature. Moral realists 
almost invariably respond to debunking arguments by reasoning from their ante-
cedent moral beliefs— the very beliefs that the debunker is calling into question— to 
the conclusion that evolution is more or less bound to lead us to accurate moral 
beliefs. For instance, one can find Robert Nozick and David Enoch advancing some-
thing like the following response:  It’s no accident that we evolved to believe that 
protecting our children is good and obligatory, since such moral beliefs motivate us 
to perform actions that promote inclusive fitness. Moreover, protecting our children 
is good and obligatory (there’s the bootstrapping). So, it’s no accident that we have 
accurate moral beliefs.1 7
Indeed, consider what Street herself has to say on behalf of her antirealist re-
sponse to the moral- debunking arguments:
[O] f course it is no coincidence that there is such a striking overlap between the con-
tent of evaluative truths and the content that natural selection would have tended to 
push us toward. Of course it’s no coincidence that, say, breaking one’s bones is bad and 
that’s also exactly what evolutionary theory would have predicted we think. But whereas 
the realist is forced to offer the scientifically unacceptable tracking explanation of this 
overlap, the antirealist is able to give a very different account. (2006, 153)
In other words, the antirealist thesis that moral reactions determine the moral facts 
best explains the striking overlap between adaptive moral beliefs and accurate moral 
beliefs. What, though, is her reason for thinking that they overlap? Evidently it’s that 
believing bone- breaking to be bad is adaptive and it’s true that it’s bad; believing we 
have obligations to our children is adaptive and it’s true that we do; and so forth. 
What reason is there, though, to believe that it’s true that bone- breaking is bad or 
that we have obligations to our children? Street is silent on the matter, presumably 
17   See Nozick 1 981 , 342– 48, and Enoch 201 0, secs. 3– 5; 201 1 , chap. 7. Other bootstrappers include 
Copp 2008, Schafer 201 0, Wielenberg 201 0, Skarsaune 201 1 , and Clarke- Doane 201 5, 201 6.
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because she takes herself to be stating the obvious— the obvious deliverances of her 
moral reactions. She is bootstrapping from these reactions to an antirealist vindica-
tion of her moral reactions.
How can metaethicists be so complacent about bootstrapping? The short answer 
(which is all that we will have space for here) is that, as incredibly tempting as it may 
be to dismiss bootstrapping as question- begging, one of the lessons of contempo-
rary epistemology is that we must resist temptation on pain of sweeping skeptical 
results.1 8 For instance, one might complain that the bootstrapping is question- 
begging because the bootstrapper is relying on beliefs that the debunker does not 
agree are true. But, if we really are prohibited from relying on beliefs that one’s skep-
tical interlocutors find suspect, then merely encountering a skeptic who insists that 
none of your beliefs are justified would be enough to render you unable to escape 
their arguments, however bad those arguments may be. So we had better not accept 
any such evidence neutrality constraint.
Alternatively, one might complain that the bootstrapping is question- begging 
because the bootstrapper relies on her moral or perceptual faculties without any 
independent evidence of their reliability. But requiring that one always have inde-
pendent evidence of the reliability of a source of information before relying on it 
leads straight to a fairly obvious regress. Each source would have to be validated by 
some further source, which would have to be validated by another source, ad infi-
nitum. Without infinitely many distinct sources to draw on, the chain of sources 
must either form a loop, with some source ultimately validating itself, or the chain 
must come to an end, with an unvalidated source ultimately validating all the others. 
If relying on self- validating and unvalidated sources is forbidden— as it would be if 
we require all sources to be independently validated— then we are stuck with the 
intolerable skeptical conclusion that no sources can be relied upon. Thus, on pain 
of global skepticism, one must allow that there are some basic sources to which we 
are simply entitled to help ourselves, even without independent evidence of their 
accuracy. And, once one recognizes the need for this, it is hard to see what would be 
wrong with believing what follows deductively, inductively, or abductively from the 
deliverances of those basic sources— including when what follows is some vindica-
tion of the sources themselves (e.g., that they are reliable).
I obviously don’t expect to have won many over by these brief remarks in defense 
of bootstrapping. Still, I’m right about this, and I will proceed on the assumption 
that if there’s something wrong with bootstrapping vindications of object reactions 
and moral reactions, it’s not merely that they involve bootstrapping.1 9 That said, 
18   For the long answer, see Nozick 1 981 , 1 97– 98; Alston 1 986; Bonjour 1 998, sec. 5.5; Huemer 2001 , 
sec. 8.2; Van Cleve 2003; Bergmann 2004; Pryor 2004; Feldman 2005, 95; Williamson 2007, sec. 7.3; 
Kelly 2008; Vogel 2008; Titelbaum 201 0; and Alexander 201 1  on the skeptical ramifications of uni-
versal demands for evidence neutrality, independent evidence, and/ or noncircularity.
19   Those familiar with this literature might wonder whether one can embrace bootstrapping as 
I have without also licensing Roxanne’s track- record reasoning from Vogel 2000. The answer is yes; 
see Bergmann 2004 and Vogel’s more bootstrapping- friendly 2008 for two promising approaches.
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8 whatever entitlement we have to trust these sources, and whatever justification we 
have for beliefs formed on their basis, is surely defeasible. The remainder of the 
paper is devoted to examining what might be able to defeat these beliefs. We’ll begin 
with the suggestion that the beliefs are defeated once they are shown to be insensitive 
to the facts in question.
13.6  SENSITIVITY
13.6.1  Merricks’s Overdetermination Argument
Trenton Merricks advances an overdetermination argument against midsized inan-
imate objects.20 Any phenomenon that we might ordinarily point to as being caused 
by midsized inanimates is already being caused by the atoms that putatively com-
pose it. Accordingly, the idea goes, we should deny that the midsized inanimates 
exist, on pain of implausibly and unparsimoniously taking such phenomena to be 
systematically overdetermined by midsized objects and pluralities of atoms.
Merricks anticipates the bootstrapping response advanced in the previous section, 
that I am entitled to believe in midsized objects because I can see them and see that 
they have everything it takes to enter into causal relations. In response, Merricks argues 
that any perceptual reasons we have for believing in midsized objects are undermined 
as soon as we acknowledge that such objects would be mere overdeterminers.
How? “[E] ven if there were no statues,” he says, “our perceptions of ‘each statue’ 
would be the same, caused by atoms arranged statuewise working in concert” (2003, 
739). And this realization is meant to act as a defeater for our beliefs:
[O] nce a perceiver realizes that her perceptual experiences of statues would be the 
same whether or not statues existed, it seems clear that those experiences no longer 
justify her belief in statues (in addition to atoms arranged statuewise). It seems clear 
that this realization “defeats” any justification that might have come from seeing 
statues. (2003, 739– 40)
Extrapolating somewhat, we get the following argument:
(S1)  You would have believed that there are statues even if it were false that there are 
statues, and you realize this.
(S2)  If you realize that you would have believed p even if p were false, then you are not 
justified in believing p.
(S3) So, you are not justified in believing that there are statues.21
20   See Merricks 2001 , chap. 3; 2003. See his 2001 , chap. 4, on why some composites are spared from 
elimination.
21   Merricks never explicitly endorses anything as general as S2. It may be that the argument would 
be more faithfully rendered as an argument from analogy, turning on the premise that there is no 
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S1  is meant to be supported by the observation that statues (if they exist) are mere 
overdeterminers. Since the presence and activities of the atoms arranged statuewise 
is already enough to produce the experience as of a statue, the absence of a statue 
composed of them would make no difference to whether you end up having such 
an experience.
S2 says that recognizing that a belief is insensitive— that you would have had it 
even if it were false— undermines the belief.22 In support of the claim that recognized 
insensitivity is a defeater, Merricks presents the following case:
You gaze upon the Emerald City. Its buildings appear to be green. You are then informed 
that your glasses have green lenses. Thus you learn that the buildings would appear 
green to you even if they were some other color. And so you are no longer justified in 
believing that the buildings are green. (2003, 739)
Recognized insensitivity, the idea goes, explains why you lose your justification 
upon learning about the colored lenses. And if this is what undermines justification 
here, it plausibly undermines justification wherever else it rears its head.23
In what follows, I’ll grant S2 for the sake of the argument, and focus just on S1 .24 
But before turning to S1 , it will be illuminating to consider an episode from the his-
tory of metaethics in which sensitivity also makes a notable appearance. Curiously, 
in this episode the roles are reversed:  sensitivity is wielded by the bootstrapper 
against the debunker.
13.6.2   The Harman- Sturgeon Debate
Well before the recent surge of interest in evolutionary moral- debunking arguments, 
there was the Harman/ Sturgeon debate. Gilbert Harman (1 977, chap. 1 ) maintained 
that moral reactions can be explained simply by appeal to mundane natural facts. 
epistemically significant difference between belief in statues and your color beliefs in Emerald City 
(more on Emerald City shortly). But this premise is questionable for the same sorts of reasons given 
subsequently against S1 . We have good reason to think that our color beliefs in Emerald City are 
insensitive (given our previous encounters with tinted lenses), whereas we don’t have good reason to 
think that our statue beliefs are insensitive (as I argue later). That would seem to be an epistemically 
significant difference.
22   The premise really ought to include a restriction to methods, to handle well- known 
counterexamples (see Nozick 1 981 , 1 79– 85). I  ignore this complication since what I  say below 
applies equally to more complicated formulations of the sensitivity principle.
23   Merricks also offers a second argument in support of what I am calling S2; see my 201 5, chap. 1 0, 
for discussion of his 2001 , 72– 76, argument from strange fusions. See Benovsky 201 5 and Osborne 
201 6, 21 6, for similar attempts to impugn object beliefs on grounds of insensitivity.
24   See my 201 5, sec. 7.2.2, for criticism of S2. See Vogel 201 2 for a deluge of arguments that insen-
sitivity does not preclude knowledge, arguments that can be repurposed to show that recognized 
insensitivity does not preclude justification.
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0 This threatens to make moral facts entirely irrelevant to the explanation of our moral 
reactions, which in turn threatens to show that our moral reactions cannot serve as 
evidence for moral beliefs formed on their basis.
In reply, Nicholas Sturgeon (1 988) suggested a way of checking whether the 
moral facts are or aren’t explanatorily relevant. Explanations tend to support 
counterfactuals: if A explains B, then had it not been the case that A it would not 
have been the case that B.25 Accordingly, to get to the bottom of whether moral 
facts explain moral reactions, we should ask ourselves whether we would have had 
the same moral reactions had the moral facts been different— or, in other words, 
whether our reactions are sensitive to the facts. If the reactions are sensitive, that’s 
reason to think that the moral facts are explaining the reactions; if they’re insensi-
tive, that’s reason to think that the moral facts aren’t explaining the reactions.
Following Sturgeon (1 988, 246– 48), let’s apply the test to Harman’s own case. You 
turn the corner, see the kids setting fire to the cat, and immediately judge them to be 
doing something wrong. To check whether the fact that they are doing something 
wrong explains your judgment, we need to assess the following conditional:
(CF)  You would have judged that they were engaged in wrongdoing even had they not 
been engaged in wrongdoing.
If CF is true, then the fact that they’re engaged in wrongdoing fails the test for explan-
atory relevance. If CF is false, then that fact passes the test for explanatory relevance.
We know how to assess conditionals like CF. You imagine a situation in which 
the kids aren’t doing something wrong but that is otherwise as similar as possible to 
how things actually are. That is, you imagine the “closest world” in which they aren’t 
doing something wrong. Then you check whether in that situation you judge them 
to be doing something wrong.26 What, then, is the closest world in which they’re not 
doing something wrong?
Error theorists and realists will predictably reach different conclusions when they 
ask themselves this question. The error theorist thinks that nothing has any moral 
properties, in which case setting fire to the cat isn’t even actually wrong. Thus, by her 
lights, the closest no- wrongdoing world is the actual world, a world in which they’re 
setting fire to a cat. Since that world (a.k.a. this world) is one in which you do judge 
them to be doing something wrong, CF comes out true.
Now for the moral realist. What, by her lights, is the closest world in which the 
kids aren’t engaged in any wrongdoing? Not one in which they are doing the same 
as what they actually are doing. We’d have to go to pretty far- out worlds to find 
ones in which the kids are setting fire to a cat and yet (by realist lights) doing no 
wrong— maybe worlds where cats are unaffected by fire, or where setting fire to the 
25   See Sturgeon 1 988, 245 n. 1 9, on some notable exceptions.
26   Cf. Stalnaker 1 968 and Lewis 1 973.
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cat will foil some terrorist plot. Rather, the closest worlds in which they’re doing 
nothing wrong are ones in which they’re “engaged in some robust but innocent fun” 
(Sturgeon 1 988, 247), like arm- wrestling or racing their bikes. Since we’re not abso-
lute curmudgeons— liable to think the kids are up to no good no matter what they’re 
doing— we don’t in these close- by worlds judge that they’re engaged in wrongdoing. 
CF thus comes out false by the moral realist’s lights, and the moral facts pass the test 
for being relevant to our moral reactions. So, moral realists should conclude that 
moral facts do explain our moral reactions.
Is this line of reasoning somehow illicit? True, the moral realist is taking for 
granted the accuracy of her moral reactions in the face of the explanatory challenge, 
without offering any independent evidence of their reliability. But, as Sturgeon 
emphasizes (1 988, 237– 38), there is nothing dialectically illicit about that. Harman’s 
concern is that even if the moral facts are as the moral realist takes them to be, they 
are explanatorily irrelevant. Harman is therefore inviting us to start from the as-
sumption that the moral facts are as we think they are and see if he is right about 
what follows. Nor, I would add, is there anything epistemically illicit about the rea-
soning. As we saw in section 1 3.5, it had better at least sometimes be legitimate to 
believe the deliverances of a source of information even when one has no inde-
pendent evidence of its reliability. Some auxiliary argument would be needed to 
establish that our moral faculties are not among those sources for which we enjoy 
this default entitlement.
Here then, as I see it, is the upshot of the Harman/ Sturgeon debate. Sturgeon 
is right. Counterfactuals like CF cannot be assessed without first taking a stand 
on what the moral facts actually are. And just as you are entitled to rely on your 
moral reactions in deciding whether to call the cops on the kids, you are entitled to 
rely on your moral reactions in assessing Harman’s concern that moral facts don’t 
explain our moral reactions. Drawing on such reactions, those of us who were 
realists to begin with ought to think that CF is false and that the facts do explain 
the reactions.
13.6.3  The Sensitivity of Object Beliefs
Now back to Merricks’s argument, which similarly turns on assessing our reactions 
to CF- like conditionals. Recall S1 :
(S1)  You would have believed that there are statues even if it were false that there are 
statues, and you realize this.
Should we accept S1 ? Certainly a statue eliminativist, who believes only in the atoms 
arranged statuewise, will think it’s true of you. After all, the eliminativist thinks the 
closest world in which it’s false that there are statues is the actual world— in which 
case, since you (I assume) do actually believe in statues, S1  comes out true.
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2 What, though, should the statue realist think is the closest world in which there 
are no statues? Not one in which there are atoms arranged statuewise. We’d have to 
go to pretty far- out worlds to find ones in which there are atoms arranged statuewise 
but no statues— perhaps all the way out to impossible worlds. Rather, the closest 
worlds in which there are no statues are perfectly normal statueless worlds in which 
there are no atoms arranged statuewise either. Since we’re not weirdly fanatical about 
statues— liable to think there are statues when there aren’t even atoms arranged 
statuewise around— we’ll judge in such close- by worlds that there are no statues. S1  
comes out false by the statue realist’s lights.
Just like the moral realist in section 1 3.6.2, the statue realist is within her dialec-
tical and epistemic rights to rely on her object reactions when reasoning her way to 
the falsity of S1 . Merricks and other eliminativists are of course welcome to accept 
S1 , but noneliminativists shouldn’t be convinced by his argument.
Some, I suspect, will complain that Sturgeon and I have missed the point. If you 
vary the moral facts while holding fixed what the kids are doing, they’ll say, our moral 
beliefs would be the same; if you vary the midsized object facts while holding fixed 
how all the atoms are arranged, they’ll say, our object beliefs would be the same. 
Maybe so.27 But it’s hard to see what of interest is supposed to follow from these 
counterfactuals. To derive any interesting epistemic consequences from them, we’d 
have to replace S2 with something like the following:
(S2′)  If you realize that you would have believed that p even if (i) p were false and (ii) all 
non- p facts were exactly the same, then you are not justified in believing p.
But this is going to undermine beliefs that moral skeptics and object eliminativists 
never meant to challenge. You look at a reliable thermometer— or, if you insist, 
atoms arranged thermometerwise— that reads 87 degrees, and you’re justified in 
believing that it’s 87 degrees. But you would have believed this even if (i) it weren’t 
87 degrees and (ii) the thermometer still read 87 degrees. So S2′ wrongly classifies 
your belief as unjustified.28
13.7  LIMITS ON BOOTSTRAPPING
13.7.1  Explanatory Concessions
We have a default entitlement to believe and reason from the deliverances of our 
perceptual and moral faculties. The entitlement is of course defeasible. We have just 
been assessing one candidate defeater— insensitivity— but we did not find any con-
vincing reason to agree that the targeted reactions are insensitive.
27   Though I have my doubts; see my 201 5, 98.
28   Cf. Sturgeon 1 988, 250– 53. I leave it as an exercise for the reader to try to find a sensitivity con-
straint that undermines moral beliefs and object beliefs without overgeneralizing in this way.
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I turn now to another putative defeater: the discovery that our moral reactions and 
object reactions bear no explanatory connection to their subject matter. Plausibly, 
discovering, or even just conceding (rightly or wrongly), that one is forming one’s 
beliefs about some domain D for reasons having entirely nothing to do with the D- 
facts is poised to serve as a defeater for any justification one might otherwise have 
for one’s D- beliefs.29 This suggests an explanatory constraint on justification: one is 
justified in believing p only if one believes that it is at least in part because of p that 
one believes p. (We’ll see a more adequate formulation of the constraint in section 
1 3.8.) This is why it would be troubling if Merricks were right that our object beliefs 
are insensitive: if indeed they are, then that would suggest that it’s not because there 
are statues that we believe in statues, which in turn undermines our entitlement to 
such beliefs. This is why it is troubling to find out that you are wearing green lenses 
in Emerald City: your entitlement to your color beliefs is defeated once (and be-
cause) you become convinced that it’s because the lenses are green, and not because 
the buildings are green, that you believe the buildings to be green. Ultimately, it is 
the explanatory concessions that defeat the beliefs.
Crucially, Sturgeon does accept that moral facts play a role in explaining 
our moral reactions. Indeed, he invokes sensitivity precisely for the purpose of 
establishing the explanatory relevance of moral facts. So he doesn’t run afoul of this 
defeater. But forget about Sturgeon, and consider Shmurgeon. Shmurgeon concedes 
that there is no explanatory connection between his moral reactions and the moral 
facts— maybe because he can’t see how moral features could have any kind of causal 
efficacy, or because he thinks that citing moral facts would be objectionably re-
dundant or unparsimonious. Shmurgeon concedes that his belief that the kids are 
engaged in wrongdoing is not even partly explained by the action’s in fact being 
wrong. Nevertheless, Shmurgeon stands by his sensitivity beliefs. Like Sturgeon, he 
bootstraps from his moral reactions to the conclusion that CF is false: the closest no- 
wrongdoing worlds are ones in which the kids are racing their bikes.
This, I  submit, is epistemically impermissible. Once you concede that your 
moral faculties render the verdicts they do about the moral facts for reasons having 
nothing at all to do with what the moral facts actually are, you lose any entitle-
ment you had for relying on those faculties. Shmurgeon accepts that it is not because 
the actions are wrong that he believes or perceives or intuits them to be wrong. He 
accepts that which moral features things have has nothing to do with why he makes 
the judgments he does. And once he makes this explanatory concession he thereby 
loses his entitlement to the moral judgments, and bootstrapping from them is no 
longer an option.
The lesson here is that sensitivity derives whatever significance it has from its 
connection to explanation. Sensitivity is a mark of an explanatory connection. The 
29   Cf. Benacerraf 1 973; Sayre- McCord 1 988, secs. 5– 6; Field 1 989, 25– 30; Gibbard 2003, chap. 1 3; 
Locke 201 4; and Korman 201 5, chap. 7.3.
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4 absence of the former is some evidence for the absence of the latter, and discovering 
the absence of the explanatory connection is what does the defeating. Accordingly, 
once one has made the explanatory concession, it is neither here nor there that one 
can reason one’s way from the disconnected beliefs to sensitivity. For whatever jus-
tification those beliefs once had has already been undermined by the explanatory 
concession.
13.7.2   Flouting the Explanatory Constraint
The above observation about explanatory connections and their relation to sen-
sitivity has ramifications for a certain style of response to debunking arguments 
found both in the objects literature and in the moral literature. I’ll start with the 
former.
In his recent book, Thomas Hofweber (201 6, chap.  7.3) offers a response to 
Merricks’s argument that is somewhat different from the one I  have advanced. 
Whereas I maintain that midsized objects and their atomic parts overdetermine our 
object reactions, Hofweber suggests that we can stand by our object beliefs “even if 
Merricks is right about the simples doing all the causal work” (1 95):
How our beliefs are causally produced in us is not the crucial question for epistemology. 
Whether they track [i.e., are sensitive to30] the facts is relevant for this, and the answer 
is that they do, or so we have reason to think. (194)
And what reason do we have for thinking that our object beliefs track the object 
facts? Our object reactions, to which we are defeasibly entitled, and from which we 
can bootstrap to the sensitivity of the reactions:
The counterfactual situation relevant to evaluate the counterfactual conditional about 
my cup not being there [viz. that if the cup didn’t exist, then I wouldn’t believe it exists] 
isn’t one where the simples are still there, but they somehow don’t compose a cup, but 
rather one where both the simples and the cup are gone. But then nothing would cause 
me to believe in a cup in front of me. (194)
On a natural reading, then, Hofweber is saying that our object beliefs are sensitive 
to the object facts even though the facts don’t causally explain the beliefs (they do 
no “causal work”).31
30   Hofweber doesn’t explicitly define tracking in terms of sensitivity, but he does informally gloss the 
former in terms of the latter: “My belief that there is a cup in front of me does track the cup in the 
sense that if the cup didn’t exist then I wouldn’t have this belief ” (201 6, 1 94).
31   Since I wrote this chapter, Hofweber has informed me that this is a misconstrual. He does say that 
the object facts do no causal work but doesn’t thereby mean to deny that they causally explain the ob-
ject reactions (a distinction I’d be interested to see spelled out in greater detail). I’ve chosen to leave 
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So understood, Hofweber is a real- life Shmurgeon, bootstrapping from his object 
reactions to a vindication of those reactions, all the while granting that the sensi-
tivity is not underwritten by an explanatory connection between the reactions and 
the facts. Thus, he runs afoul of our explanatory constraint, and thereby undermines 
his entitlement to the object reactions from which he bootstraps. It is neither here 
nor there that he can reason his way from the discredited object reactions to sensi-
tivity. Pace Hofweber, how the beliefs are produced is the crucial question, and the 
answer needs to be: by the associated facts.32
The explanatory constraint also has ramifications for the moral- debunking liter-
ature. There, one of the dominant strategies— what Dustin Locke (201 4) dubs “the 
minimalist response”— has been to grant M1  and instead deny M2. The strategy is 
to grant that one’s moral reactions are not explained by the moral facts, but show 
how our moral reactions could still turn out to be sensitive, or safe, or in some other 
way nonaccidentally accurate. Do we have reason to think that this not only could 
happen, but has happened? Yes, the idea goes, for we can bootstrap from our moral 
reactions to the conclusion that they are nonaccidentally accurate (recall the Nozick/ 
Enoch reasoning from section 1 3.5).33
What minimalists are presumably thinking is that explanatory connections have 
epistemic import only insofar as they are decent indicators of nonaccidental accu-
racy. Justin Clarke- Doane (201 5, sec. 6), for instance, insists that if— using our ante-
cedent moral beliefs— we can assure ourselves that our moral beliefs are “bound to 
be true,” it couldn’t possibly matter whether one accepts an explanatory connection. 
But if the explanatory constraint is correct, then this sort of bootstrapping cannot 
even get off the ground; the explanatory concession undermines our entitlement to 
the moral reactions before the bootstrapping begins. Indeed, I think the minimalist 
has things exactly the wrong way round: once we concede that there is no explana-
tory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral facts, it couldn’t possibly 
matter that we can use the discredited, disconnected beliefs to assure ourselves that 
the beliefs are bound to be true.34
the criticism in the text, with apologies to Hofweber, since I suspect some will still be tempted by the 
strategy I understood him to be advancing— and I didn’t want to try readers’ patience by changing 
it to a critique of Shmofweber.
32   See my 201 4, secs. 3– 4; 201 5, chap. 7, on other attempts to block the object- debunking arguments 
while granting that there is no explanatory connection.
33   Minimalist strategies have been advanced or defended by Nozick 1 981 , 342– 48; Dworkin 1 996, 
1 1 7– 26; Huemer 2005, 21 8– 1 9; Enoch 201 0, secs. 3– 5; 201 1 , sec. 7.4; Schafer 201 0; White 201 0, 
588– 89; Wielenberg 201 0, secs. 4– 8; 201 4, chap. 4; 201 6, sec. 3; Brosnan 201 1 , 60– 63; Parfit 201 1 , 
532– 33; Skarsaune 201 1 , sec. 3; Berker 201 4; Clarke- Doane 201 5, secs. 4– 6; 201 6, secs. 2– 4; Talbott 
201 5; Moon 201 7; and Schechter 201 8, sec. 6. Some on this list are more explicit (or aware) than 
others about the need for bootstrapping.
34   See Korman and Locke (forthcoming) for more on minimalist responses to moral- debunking 
arguments.
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6 13.8   WHAT IS THE EXPLANATORY CONSTRAINT?
What we have seen is that debunking arguments may be resisted by bootstrapping 
from antecedent beliefs, so long as bootstrappers respect the explanatory constraint 
on their entitlement to those beliefs. But what exactly is the explanatory constraint? 
Let’s start simple and work our way to a viable formulation.35 Impatient readers can 
jump down to EC5 to see where we are headed.
We’ll begin with EC1 :
(EC1) S is justified in believing p only if: [S believes p] because p.
In other words: only if the fact that p at least partly explains S’s believing p. This is ob-
viously too demanding. An unwitting brain in a vat is justified in believing that it has 
hands even though its belief that it has hands is not explained by its having hands.
This leads us to EC2:
(EC2) S is justified in believing p only if: S believes that [[S believes p] because p].
Unlike EC1 , EC2 does not imply that the brain in a vat is unjustified, since the brain 
at least thinks that its beliefs are explained by the associated facts. But EC2 cannot 
be right as it stands because it cannot accommodate inductive beliefs. Take, for in-
stance, beliefs about the future. The sun’s rising tomorrow clearly doesn’t explain 
your belief that it will, and you realize this. Nevertheless, your belief that it will rise 
tomorrow is surely justified. Other counterexamples to EC2 include cases where the 
belief and the associated fact have a common cause. I believe that the email I sent 
you is in your inbox, not because it is in your inbox, but because I clicked send.
The fix is to allow beliefs to be justified even when they’re not believed to be 
explained by the associated facts, so long as they’re prima facie justified by beliefs 
that themselves are believed to be explained by the associated facts:
(EC3)  S is justified in believing p only if: either (i) S believes that [[S believes p] because 
p], or (ii) S’s belief that p is based on beliefs Bp1 . . . Bpn that prima facie justify 
S in believing that p and S believes that [[S believes p1 . . . pn] because p1 . . . pn].
Your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on your beliefs that it rose today 
and yesterday and the day before that; those beliefs do prima facie justify your belief 
that it will rise tomorrow; and you do think that its rising today explains your belief 
that it rose today, and likewise for the rest of the beliefs in your inductive base. So 
35   For some alternative formulations of the constraint, see Locke 201 4, 232; McCain 201 4, sec. 4.4 
and 6.4; Lutz 201 8, sec. 2; Schechter 201 8, sec. 3; and Korman and Locke forthcoming, sec. 8.
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the second disjunct is satisfied. Similarly, my belief that my email is in your inbox 
is prima facie justified by my belief that I clicked send, and I do think that my belief 
that I clicked send is explained by my clicking send.
EC3 makes room for justified inductive beliefs. But it threatens to 
overintellectualize justification (as does EC2). EC3 will entail that a young child— 
old enough to have beliefs about apples but too young to have beliefs about beliefs— 
cannot be justified in believing that there is an apple present. This can be handled 
by weakening the constraint so that what’s required isn’t belief but rather not with-
holding belief:
(EC4)  S is justified in believing p only if:  either (i)  S doesn’t withhold belief that 
[[S believes p] because p], or (ii) S’s belief that p is based on beliefs Bp1 . . . Bpn 
that prima facie justify S in believing that p and S doesn’t withhold belief that 
[[S believes p1 . . . pn] because p1 . . . pn].
Withholding belief is something more deliberate than failing to believe.36 It involves 
entertaining a proposition and then opting not to believe it, either by disbelieving it 
or by remaining agnostic. A young child who, lacking the requisite concepts, cannot 
entertain propositions about what she does or doesn’t believe won’t count as with-
holding belief in those propositions. Counterexample averted.
EC4 permits justified inductive beliefs without depriving brains in vats and 
young children of justified perceptual beliefs. But it is still open to counterexamples 
like the following. Upon naming my dog “Emmylou,” it is not her being named 
“Emmylou” that explains my belief that her name is “Emmylou.” Rather, it’s my 
taking her name to be “Emmylou” that explains why she is named “Emmylou.” 
Since I recognize that the explanation doesn’t run from the fact to the belief, EC4 
entails that I’m not justified in believing her name to be “Emmylou.” But obviously 
I am so justified.
The fix is to allow explanations to run in either direction: world to mind or mind 
to world. It’s fine to acknowledge that my belief that p isn’t explained by p so long as 
I think that my believing p explains why it’s true that p. Let’s say that the belief that 
p is e- connected to p iff either the belief that p is explained by the fact that p or vice 
versa. Now we can say:
(EC5)  S is justified in believing p only if: either (i) S doesn’t withhold belief that [S’s belief 
that p is e- connected to p], or (ii) S’s belief that p is based on beliefs Bp1 . . . Bpn 
that prima facie justify S in believing p and S doesn’t withhold belief that 
[S’s beliefs that p1 . . . pn are e- connected to p1 . . . pn].
36   See Bergmann 2005, 420– 21  and Locke 201 4, 223, on withholding.
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8 I do believe that my belief that my dog’s name is “Emmylou” is e- connected to her 
being named “Emmylou,” since I take the former to explain the latter. So EC5 won’t 
entail that the belief is unjustified.37 This revision also makes room for antirealist 
treatments of the debunking arguments, denying O1  or M1  on the grounds that our 
reactions determine the associated facts.38
These refinements won’t affect my earlier objections to Hofweber. Hofweber’s 
strategy (as I  interpreted it) involves withholding belief as to whether I  believe 
there is a cup before me because there is a cup before me. And he certainly doesn’t 
think that the explanation runs in the other direction, that there is a cup before 
me because I believe there to be one. So condition (i) of EC5 is not satisfied. What 
about condition (ii)? The only reasons Hofweber cites for his cup beliefs are his cup 
experiences. Trivially, then, his cup beliefs are not based on any beliefs that he takes 
to be e- connected to the cup facts. So condition (ii) is not satisfied either.
One might suggest that there is still a problem with EC5, insofar as it cannot 
accommodate foundational a priori beliefs about necessary truths. On pain of 
antirealism or skepticism about mathematics, EC5 looks to require us to accept 
(or at least not withhold belief) that mathematical facts explain our mathemat-
ical beliefs. Some may find this intolerable. But one’s modus tollens, as they say, is 
another’s modus ponens. I say that realists cannot stand by the belief that 1  + 1  is 2 
once they concede that they believe this for reasons having nothing whatsoever to 
do with what the sum of 1  and 1  actually is. Benacerraf (1 973) and Field (1 989) are 
right that this is an unstable epistemic position. To be sure, I agree that it’s unclear 
how mathematical facts could explain our beliefs. But, unless you’re ready to em-
brace mathematical skepticism or antirealism, you had better be prepared to accept 
that they somehow manage to do so.39
13.9   CONCLUSION
Here is what I hope to have shown. Even what would seem to be some of our most 
secure beliefs, our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, are not safe from 
debunking by cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. But even when cog-
nitive scientists or evolutionary psychologists are able to explain some range of 
beliefs without reference to the associated range of facts, we needn’t accept that these 
explanations are the full story. For we are often entitled to bootstrap to an expanded 
37   Actually, it’s probably more complicated than that. It’s my intention that her name be “Emmylou” 
that explains both why her name is “Emmylou” and why I believe that her name is “Emmylou.” 
Accordingly, it’s the second clause of EC5 that handles this case: my belief that I intend for her name 
to be “Emmylou” is explained by my having that intention; I believe that this is so; and my belief that 
I intended that this be her name, together with the belief that she is mine to name (which I take to be 
e- connected to the fact that she is mine to name), prima facie justify my belief that this is her name.
38   Cf. Goldman 1 992, chaps. 2– 3, for subjectivist “demotions” of objects, color, and modality in re-
sponse to challenges from cognitive science.
39   See Bengson 201 5 for one proposal.
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explanation that does cite the associated facts. That said, one’s bootstrapping had 
better culminate in embracing some such explanatory connection, for conceding 
that there is no connection would undermine one’s entitlement to bootstrap.
I certainly don’t take myself to have resolved the dispute between the debunker 
and the bootstrapper. In truth, I  think that we have only just scratched the sur-
face. Among other things, I  think that there are further constraints on legitimate 
bootstrapping than simply allowing some explanatory connection between your 
beliefs and associated facts. Elsewhere, I have argued that the explanatory connec-
tion one takes to hold between beliefs and the facts must be “nondeviant,” and that 
bootstrappers have their work cut out for them showing how a causal connection 
between midsized objects and object beliefs could be nondeviant.40 If I am right 
about this, then bootstrappers cannot dismiss the object- debunking arguments 
simply on the grounds that midsized objects are poised to cause our object beliefs. 
And it is worth considering whether the threat of deviance also arises for responses 
to the moral- debunking arguments according to which moral properties are proxi-
mate or supervenient causes of moral beliefs,41  which is something I hope to explore 
in future work.
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